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This paper shows that they are. In one example, the actual consumers require 56%
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1. Introduction
A great deal of economic analysis treats aggregate community demand as if it were
the demand of a single competitive \representative" consumer. Representative consumer
models allow analysts to focus on economic e±ciency, leaving equity considerations aside.
However, the aggregation across consumers that is implicit in these models is often problem-
atic. Aggregate community demand might violate revealed preference axioms that would
be satis¯ed if there were just one consumer. As a result, representative consumer models
could misrepresent the e®ects of changes in endowments, technology or policy on prices and
aggregate consumption. But this is not the only problem. Even when aggregate community
demand satis¯es the strong axiom and therefore is indistinguishable from the demand of
a single competitive consumer, the single-consumer model might not be adequate for eval-
uating e±ciency. The representative consumer can be Pareto inconsistent, preferring an
aggregate situation A to B even though all the actual consumers in the community prefer
B to A (Jerison (1984) and Dow and Werlang (1988)).
Should representative consumers be banished from economic analysis because they might
be Pareto inconsistent? That would be going too far. The inconsistencies might be very
small or might arise only in unrealistic settings. In Jerison's (1984) example of inconsis-
tency, a payment of less than 0.5% of aggregate income is enough bring the representative
consumer into agreement with the actual consumers in the community. Dow and Werlang
(1988) give an example of a larger Pareto inconsistency, but it is not robust. It requires
a special discontinuity in the way the consumers' incomes vary depending on prices and
aggregate income. Kirman (1992) gives another example of a large Pareto inconsistency.
But the consumption vector chosen by his \representative individual" equals the aggregate
consumption vector only in the two budget situations being compared, not in others. In
the present paper, as in Samuelson (1956), Jerison (1984), and Dow and Werlang (1988),
we restrict attention to the most favorable case for representative consumer analysis, the
case in which there is a \positive" representative consumer whose demand is the same as
the aggregate demand no matter what aggregate income and prices are. The positive repre-
sentative consumer's preferences generate the entire aggregate demand function. Reasons
for considering this case are given below.
This paper examines the conditions under which a positive representative consumer can
be Pareto inconsistent, and the possible sizes of the inconsistencies. The adequacy of a
representative consumer model depends on which communities and which policies or events
are to be analyzed. If all the actual consumers are competitive and identical then there
is a positive representative consumer model that makes accurate predictions and Pareto
consistent welfare judgments for all possible policies and events. But this is certainly a
limited case, considering the varied consumer behavior we observe. In order to apply the
conclusions from representative consumer models to broader classes of communities, it is
necessary to restrict the range of possible policies and events considered.
Since our goal is to study models that are used to analyze changes in endowments,
technology and policy, we allow aggregate income to vary independently of prices. We
also assume that the consumers' incomes are determined by aggregate income and prices.
The function thus de¯ned is called a \sharing rule" in the literature on collective choice
(Bourguignon and Chiappori (1992)). We prefer to use the more neutral term \distribution
rule" since \sharing" may evoke voluntary interaction among the community members. In
this paper, the community could be all the consumers in a country rather than the members
of a family, and the income distribution could be determined by taxes.3
If no restriction is placed on the distribution of income, then a positive representative
consumer exists only for very implausible communities. In that case, a positive represen-
tative consumer exists only if income redistribution has no e®ect on the aggregate demand
vector. This implies that for each good, at all prices and income levels, all consumers'
marginal propensities to consume are equal (Antonelli (1886), Gorman (1953) and Nataf
(1953)).
This unrealistic restriction is avoided when we assume that incomes are determined
according to a distribution rule. In that case, aggregate demand is a function of prices
and aggregate income no matter what individual preferences are. A positive representative
consumer is simply a utility function that generates the entire aggregate demand function.
Pure income redistribution without any change in prices or aggregate income is ruled out
a priori (or, if it occurs, the aggregate demand vector and the representative consumer's
utility function are allowed to change).
In the language of the collective choice literature, existence of a positive representative
consumer means that the community is \unitary," i.e., it behaves like a single competitive
consumer. We will show that the preferences generating the aggregate demand function in
a unitary model do not necessarily represent the preferences of the community members.
Lucas (1987) presents a striking example of a representative consumer that ¯ts our
framework. He considers a consumer with a discount factor that generates consumption
choices matching certain features of aggregate U.S. demand. He shows that this consumer
is willing to reduce its initial consumption by 42% in order to raise its consumption growth
rate from 3% to 6%. Consumption in the 6% growth path remains less than in the 3%
growth path for the ¯rst 16 years. Lucas uses the example to compare the welfare gains
from faster growth to gains from steadier growth (removal of business cycles).
In our framework, the alternative consumption growth paths are viewed as optimal
choices of a representative consumer in alternative intertemporal budget sets. We ask
if Lucas' representative consumer's surprisingly strong preference for growth could be the
result of Pareto inconsistency. Can the representative consumer's preferences di®er sub-
stantially from those of the actual consumers in the represented community? We will see
in section 6 that the answer is no. If the consumer in the growth example is a positive rep-
resentative consumer then there must be consumers in the represented community willing
to reduce their initial consumption by over 40% in order to raise the growth rate from 3%
to 6%.
The main contributions of this paper are as follows. We ¯rst describe a simple way
to construct robust examples of positive representative consumers with large Pareto in-
consistencies. In one example, the actual consumers require 56% more income than the
representative consumer requires in order to be compensated for the doubling of a price.
However such large inconsistencies require that there is a Gi®en good for some consumer
in the community and for the representative consumer. We argue that Pareto inconsisten-
cies must be small if the representative consumer has homothetic preferences, as in Lucas'
(1987) example and in most representative consumer models in macroeconomics.
Pareto consistency is necessary in order for a representative consumer's preferences to
have a social welfare interpretation. Dow and Werlang (1988) show that it is also su±cient.
If the representative consumer is Pareto consistent, then its preferences coincide with pref-
erences derived from a particular Bergson-Samuelson social welfare function. This raises
the question which communities have Pareto consistent representative consumers.
A well-known su±cient condition for existence of a Pareto consistent representative con-
sumer is for income to be distributed optimally according to some social welfare function4
no matter what prices prevail (Samuelson (1956), Chipman and Moore (1979)). We show
that this condition is not necessary. We give an example of a Pareto consistent represen-
tative consumer in a community in which the distribution rule is not optimal with respect
to any social welfare function. We also characterize the set of economies with two goods
and a robustly Pareto consistent representative consumer (where the consistency does not
disappear when the preferences are perturbed).
We use the terms \representative consumer" and \positive representative consumer" in-
terchangeably, and we restrict attention to these representative consumers, whose demands
equal the aggregate demand at all prices and aggregate income levels. One reason for doing
so is that users of representative consumer models can always assume that they are working
with a positive representative consumer. Each competitive consumer is a positive repre-
sentative consumer for some class of communities, and it is interesting to know in which of
these communities the representative consumer can be used to evaluate e±ciency. Another
reason for considering only positive representative consumers is that national aggregate
consumption time series data rarely violate the strong axiom of revealed preference. Thus
the limited aggregate data we have are often consistent with existence of positive represen-
tative consumers (Landsburg (1981), Varian (1982)).
The framework and notation are presented in the next section. Section 3 characterizes
economies with representative consumers when the actual consumers' incomes are deter-
mined by prices and the aggregate income. Section 4 shows how to construct examples
of large Pareto inconsistencies. Section 5 derives a bound on the size of the inconsisten-
cies. Section 6 argues that there are tighter bounds in the most common macroeconomic
representative consumer models. Section 7 examines the class of communities with Pareto
consistent representative consumers and shows that it is larger than the class of communi-
ties with optimal income distribution. Section 8 discusses remaining open problems.
2. Notation
We consider a group of m ¸ 2 competitive consumers in an n-good economy. Each
consumer i has a column-vector valued demand function Xi(p;yi) generated by a utility
function ui. The corresponding indirect utility function vi(p;yi) is assumed to be twice
continuously di®erentiable with strictly positive marginal utility of income, @vi(p;yi)=@yi >
0. The expenditure function of consumer i is ei(p;u). At price vector p, with income yi,
consumer i has the marginal propensity to consume Mi(p;yi) ´ @Xi(p;yi)=@yi, the average







where the superscript T denotes the transpose.
An economic situation is represented by (p;y), where y is aggregate income (the sum of
the consumers' incomes) and p À 0 is a vector of n prices:1 A mean situation is a vector
(p;z) where z represents the average of the consumers' incomes and p is a price vector.
We allow aggregate income to vary independently of prices so that the model can apply
to comparative static analyses of changes in endowments, technology or policy. The group
members might be thought of as members of a family or as citizens of a small country so
that their consumption has no e®ect on prices.
We will use the term community to mean the group of consumers along with a \dis-
tribution rule" specifying their incomes as functions of aggregate income and prices. A
distribution rule is a continuously di®erentiable function D = (D1;:::;Dm) ¸ 0, homo-
geneous of degree 1, satisfying
P
Di(p;y) = y and Di
y(p;y) > 0. A distribution rule is a5
smooth sharing rule in the terminology of Bourguignon and Chiappori (1992). Here and be-
low, subscripts denote partial derivatives. Di(p;y) is the income of consumer i in situation
(p;y). The income share of consumer i in situation (p;y) À 0 is Di(p;y)=y. A distribution
rule need not be determined by private ownership. It can incorporate the e®ects of redis-
tributive policies. Since there are no consumption externalities in our model, allocation by
means of distribution rules is essentially equivalent to allocation that is Pareto e±cient in
every situation. Homogeneity and smoothness of the distribution rule are not required for
e±ciency. We impose these weak restrictions in order to consider cases most favorable for
the existence of a representative consumer.








It also determines the vector of consumer utilities V D(p;y) with ith component V Di(p;y) ´
vi(p;Di(p;y)). We say that there is a (positive) representative consumer for D if the aggre-
gate demand function XD is generated by a utility function. When such a utility function
exists, it determines preferences over situations and also over mean situations. We say
that the representative consumer is Pareto consistent if it prefers one situation to another
whenever all the consumers prefer the former to the latter. Formally, the representative
consumer with indirect utility function vD(p;y) is Pareto consistent if V D(p;y) À V D(q;z)
implies vD(p;y) > vD(q;z).
The distribution rule D is optimal for w : Rm ! R if, for each (p;y) À 0 and each vector
of incomes (y1;:::;ym) ¸ 0 satisfying
P





The distribution rule is optimal for w if in every situation there is no alternative distribution
of the aggregate income that yields a higher value of w. A social welfare function (in the
given community) is a nondecreasing2 real-valued function on Rm that is strictly increasing
on the set of attainable utility vectors fV D(p;y)j(p;y) À 0g. We call D optimal if it is
optimal for some social welfare function. Note that a constant function cannot be a social
welfare function, so distribution rules are not necessarily optimal. In fact, Jerison (1994)
shows that a typical (i.e., generic) distribution rule is not optimal with respect to any social
welfare function.
3. Existence of a Positive Representative Consumer
As noted in the introduction, existence of a positive representative consumer requires the
Slutsky matrix of the aggregate demand function to be symmetric and negative semide¯nite:3
These conditions are not satis¯ed automatically because the Slutsky matrix of aggregate
demand generally di®ers from the sum of the individual consumers' Slutsky matrices. The
di®erence matrix can be interpreted as the covariance matrix of two vector valued random
variables de¯ned on the set of consumers. Under certain conditions the matrix can be esti-
mated from cross section or time series data. This section de¯nes the \covariance matrix"
and shows that when it is symmetric and positive semide¯nite a representative consumer
exists. Symmetry of the covariance matrix is necessary for existence of a representative
consumer whereas positive semide¯niteness is not. On the other hand, both conditions
are necessary in order for the distribution rule to be optimal with respect to some social
welfare function (Jerison (1994)). Section 7, below, shows that if the covariance matrix is
everywhere nonzero and if there are only two goods and two consumers, then there is a
Pareto consistent representative consumer.6
It seems then that the covariance matrix should be of special interest to any user of
representative consumer models for normative analysis. For this reason we o®er a number
of interpretations for the above restrictions on the covariance matrix along with examples
of communities in which the properties are satis¯ed.
The jk component of the covariance matrix will be de¯ned to be the covariance of the
consumers' marginal propensities to consume good j and their \adjusted demands" for









where the subscripts on Di denote partial derivatives. When aggregate income is ¯xed,
a consumer's adjusted demand vector is orthogonal to the consumer's indi®erence curve
in price space (taking account of the way the consumer's income Di is a®ected by price
changes). Thus, the adjusted demand vector XDi(p;1) is parallel to the vector of price
derivatives @V Di(p;1)=@p. (This is easily veri¯ed using Roy's identity.) The homogeneity
of D implies that p ¢ XDi(p;y) = y, so the adjusted demand vector lies in the frontier of
the aggregate budget set. The adjusted demand for good k is approximately equal to the
change in aggregate income y required to compensate consumer i for a unit change in the
price of good k taking account of the e®ect of the price change on the consumer's income.













It is the covariance matrix of the consumers' marginal propensities to consume and their
adjusted demands, with consumers weighted by their marginal income shares Di
y(p;y).






Under the smoothness assumptions of our model, there is a representative consumer for
the distribution rule D if and only if the Slutsky matrix of aggregate demand is symmetric
and negative semide¯nite (Richter (1979) Theorem 12). As a consequence we have
Proposition 3.1. There is a positive representative consumer if the covariance matrix
CD(p;y) is symmetric and positive semide¯nite at each (p;y). Symmetry of this covariance
matrix is necessary for existence of a positive representative consumer.
























































Since each consumer's Slutsky matrix Si(p;yi) is symmetric and negative semide¯nite, CD
must be symmetric for SD to be symmetric. If in addition CD is positive semide¯nite, then
SD is negative semide¯nite. ¤7
Remark 3.2. Requiring the covariance matrix CD(p;y) to be symmetric and positive semi-
de¯nite does not restrict the form of the demand function of any consumer.
For example if the consumers have the same arbitrary demand function and equal income
shares, then the covariance restrictions are satis¯ed with CD = 0. On the other hand,
symmetry of the covariance matrix is not robust. It is lost under perturbation of the
consumers' preferences when there are at least three goods (Jerison (1994)). Thus, in a
typical economy with more than two goods there is no representative consumer.
It is easy to see that the covariance matrix is symmetric and positive semide¯nite in
the best-known cases where positive representative consumers exist. For example, if the
consumers have identical homothetic preferences, or, more generally, have parallel Engel
curves at each price vector p (the case considered by Antonelli (1886), Gorman (1953) and
Nataf (1953)), then their marginal propensity to consume vectors Mi(p;Di(p;y)) are equal
and CD(p;y) = 0. A positive representative consumer exists in much broader classes of
consumption sectors if the income shares are ¯xed.
















aggregate income times the covariance matrix of the consumers' marginal and average
propensities to consume, with consumers weighted by their income shares and with XD
and AD evaluated at (p;y) and Xi, Mi and Ai evaluated at (p;Di(y;p)).
When income shares are ¯xed, positive semide¯niteness of the covariance matrix means
that consumers with larger than average budget shares for any good also tend to have
higher marginal propensities to consume that good. If the consumers' preferences are
homothetic, but not necessarily identical, then CD(p;y) equals y times the covariance
matrix of the consumers' marginal propensity to consume vectors, hence is symmetric and
positive semide¯nite (Eisenberg (1961)). More generally, with ¯xed income shares and
consumer demands of Muellbauer's (1976) PIGL form, Xi(p;yi) = yi[ai(p) + bi(p)lnyi],
where ai and bi are functions from Rn into Rn, the covariance matrix becomes CD(p;1) = P




µi(ci)T, where bi and ci are evaluated at p with ci(p) ´
ai(p) + bi(p)lnµi. For symmetry and positive semide¯niteness of the covariance matrix it
is su±cient, though not necessary, that the bis or cis are identical across consumers. PIGL
demands include commonly used \°exible functional forms" such as the AID system of
Deaton and Muellbauer (1980) and demands generated by translog indirect utility functions
(Christensen, et. al. (1975)).
When the income shares are ¯xed, positive semide¯niteness of the covariance matrix
means, roughly, that the consumers' demand vectors spread out when their incomes rise
by equal amounts. To be more precise, consider a situation (p;y) and imagine a thought
experiment in which all consumers are given an additional income transfer ¢. The demand
of consumer i is then Xi(yi + ¢;p), where yi = µiy. Letting x be a vector of length 1, the
dispersion in the consumers' demand vectors in the direction x can be measured by the



















To ¯nd the e®ect of a small income transfer, we di®erentiate this variance with respect ¢
















We say that the community has increasing dispersion if for each (p;y), the matrix ~ C(p;y)
is positive semide¯nite on the hyperplane orthogonal to the aggregate demand vector
XD(p;y). This means that the consumers' demand vectors become more dispersed (or
at least not less dispersed) in all directions orthogonal to the aggregate demand when the
consumers' incomes all rise by the same small amount. A community with ¯xed income
shares has increasing dispersion if and only if its covariance matrix CD(p;y) is positive
semide¯nite for each (p;y) (Jerison (1994) Remark 3).
The hypothesis of increasing dispersion can be tested using the nonparametric statistical
method of average derivatives. HÄ ardle, et. al. (1991), Hildenbrand (1994) and Kneip
(1993) show that French and U.K. consumer expenditure data are consistent with the
hypothesis. In testing for increasing dispersion, the number of commodities matters. With
very narrowly de¯ned commodity categories there are likely to be inferior goods. For these
goods, consumers may converge toward zero consumption as they become richer. The
papers referred to above use data with goods grouped in nine to 14 commodity aggregates.
They lend support for the hypothesis of increasing dispersion in analyses of policies or
events for which this type of commodity grouping is appropriate (as it is for policies or
events that do not a®ect relative prices of goods within any given commodity group).
Remark 3.4. It is easy to verify that CD(p;y)p = CD(p;y)Tp = 0. In addition, the
n £ n symmetrized covariance matrix CD + (CD)T is the sum of 2m rank 1 matrices, so it
cannot have rank greater than maxf2m;n ¡ 1g. When it has this maximal rank, positive
semide¯niteness of the covariance matrix is a robust condition that is preserved under
perturbation of the consumers' preferences.
4. Nonrepresentative Representative Consumers
In this section we show how to construct examples of positive representative consumers
with large Pareto inconsistencies. One reason why the examples are surprising is that
positive representative consumers are Pareto consistent locally (at least to ¯rst order). To
see why, consider a smooth curve p(t) in price space, and let ^ yi(t) be the aggregate income
needed so that the utility of consumer i, V Di(p(t); ^ yi(t)) remains constant, with ^ yi(0) = ¹ y.






and, by Roy's identity, Di
y^ y0
i(t) = Xi(p;Di)p0(t)¡Di
pp0(t), where Di and its derivatives are




i(t) = XD(p(t); ^ y(t))p0(t) =
^ y0(t), where ^ y(t) is the aggregate income needed to compensate the representative consumer
so that vD(p(t); ^ y(t)) stays constant, with ^ y(0) = ¹ y. Thus, to ¯rst order, the compensation
required by the representative consumer is a weighted average of the changes in aggregate
income needed to compensate the actual members of the community. Consider a Pareto
improving path (p(t);y(t)) (0 · t · 1) with y(0) = ¹ y. As aggregate income and prices move
along the path, no consumer's utility falls, so y(t) ¸ maxi ^ yi(t) and y0(0) ¸ maxi ^ y0
i(0) ¸
^ y0(0), which implies dv(p(t);y(t))=dtjt=0 ¸ 0. To ¯rst order, the representative consumer's
utility does not fall either.
In spite of this, representative consumers need not be Pareto consistent. The following
result is useful for constructing examples of Pareto inconsistency.9
Remark 4.1. If all the consumers are indi®erent between two situations but the represen-
tative consumer is not, then the representative consumer is Pareto inconsistent.
To see this, we note ¯rst that if a representative consumer exists, it can be assumed to have a
C1 indirect utility function v. This follows from the fact that the aggregate demand function
is C1. Homogeneity of the consumers' indirect utility functions and of the distribution rule
D implies that without loss of generality we can let aggregate income equal 1. Suppose that
all members of the consumption sector are indi®erent between the price vectors p and q, but
the representative consumer prefers q, so that V D(p) = V D(q) and v(p;1) < v(q;1). This
last inequality is preserved if all components of q are proportionally decreased by a small
enough amount. But then every consumer prefers p to q even though the representative
consumer prefers q.
We will consider consumption sectors with two goods and two consumers with equal
income shares. If the consumers' preferences are homothetic, then there is a Pareto con-
sistent representative consumer. We will start with a pair of homothetic consumers and
modify their preferences in order to obtain a consumption sector with a Pareto inconsistent
representative consumer. Let the price of good 2 be ¯xed at 1. We start with a homo-
thetic consumer i (for i = 1;2) with an indirect utility function vi, expenditure function ei
and demand function xi(p;yi) for good 1. The homothetic consumers 1 and 2 are indi®er-
ent between the mean situations A = (q;1) and B = (¹ p;z), but their indi®erence curves
through A and B do not intersect at any other points in the space of aggregate income
and the price of good 1. Figures 1a and 1b show the consumers' indi®erence curves in that
space. Consumer 1 has dotted (blue) indi®erence curves and consumer 2 has broken (red)
curves. Letting ui be the utility of consumer i in the mean situations A and B, we see that
e1(q;u1) = e2(q;u2) = 1 and e1(p;u1) = e2(p;u2) = z. The corresponding representative
consumer, with a solid indi®erence curve, is also indi®erent between the mean situations A
and B.
Figure 1a Figure 1b
In a two good economy, a smooth consumer demand function x(p;y) for good 1 com-
pletely determines the consumer's indirect preferences as long as the demand function







Using this fact, we can specify new consumer preferences by changing consumer i's demand
function for good 1 to ^ xi(p;yi) = Ái(vi(p;yi)¡ui)xi(p;yi) for i = 1;2, where Ái : R ! (0;1)
is a smooth function with Á0
i(t) > 0 for t < 0 and Ái(t) = 1 for t ¸ 0. The new demand
for good 1 is the same as the old demand at points above the consumer's indi®erence
curve through A and is strictly less than the old demand at points below that indi®erence
curve. It is easy to verify that the new demand function for good 1 satis¯es the Slutsky
condition if the old one does. This implies that the new demand functions xi determine a
new consumption sector.
In the income and price space of Figures 1a and 1b, consumer i's indi®erence curve
of utility level u¤
i is the graph of the expenditure function ei(¢;1;u¤
i). Since consumer
i's demand for good 1 at mean situation (p;y) equals @ei(p;u¤
i)=@pi the modi¯cation of
i's demand described above °attens i's indi®erence curves below the curve through A
while leaving i indi®erent between A and B. If a representative consumer exists in the
new consumption sector then its indi®erence curve through A is °atter than that of the
original representative consumer. Therefore it passes below B and so, by Remark 4.1, the
representative consumer is Pareto inconsistent.
In order for the new consumption sector to have a representative consumer, the Slutsky
matrix of aggregate demand must be symmetric and negative semide¯nite. Symmetry holds



































































Here, vi and xi and their derivatives are evaluated at (p;y), and the subscripts y and p
denote partial derivatives with respect to the ¯rst and second arguments, y and p1. Both
Ái and Á0
i are evaluated at vi(p;y) ¡ ui for each i.
When each Ái is su±ciently close to 1, the Slutsky condition above is satis¯ed. This
follows from the fact that there is a representative consumer when the actual consumers
have homothetic preferences. So the argument above shows that there can be a Pareto
inconsistent representative consumer. The question is how inconsistent. If each Ái is close
to 1, then the modi¯ed consumer preferences are nearly homothetic and the representative
consumer's indi®erence curve through A passes close to B. Thus the inconsistency is small.
To obtain a large inconsistency we must make Ái(t) approach 0 rapidly as t decreases
starting from 0. But the Slutsky condition above is violated if Á0
i is too large for i = 1 or
2. For this reason, the representative consumer's indi®erence curve through A cannot be
made arbitrarily °at. Still, it can be made to pass substantially below B, as shown by the
following example.
Example 4.2. A Large Pareto Inconsistency
We start with two homothetic consumers, the ¯rst with Cobb-Douglas preferences and




2 and the second with Leontief preferences and
indirect utility function v2(p;y) = y=(p1 + bp2), where a = [ln(7=4)]=ln2 and b = 1=3.
Let the consumers receive equal income shares. The consumers are indi®erent between the
mean situations (q;1) and (p;1:75), where q = (1;1) and p = (2;1). Let xi be the demand
function for good 1 corresponding to the indirect utility function vi. As described above, we
let consumer i have a demand for good 1 that is less than xi at mean situations that yield11
utility less than vi(q;1). To be precise, let Ái(t) = exp(¡104t2) for t < 0 and Ái(t) = 1 for
t ¸ 0. Let consumer i's demand function for good 1 be ^ xi ´ Ái(vi ¡vi(q;1))xi, for i = 1;2.
It can be veri¯ed that Ái is C1 and satis¯es Á0
i(t) > 0 for t < 0. It can be checked numer-
ically that aggregate demand satis¯es Slutsky negative semide¯niteness, so the modi¯ed
consumption sector has a representative consumer.
In the modi¯ed consumption sector the representative consumer's indi®erence curve
through (q;1) is the graph of the function c(t) satisfying c(1) = 1 and the di®erential
equation c0(t) = ^ x(t;1;c(t)), where ^ x ´ (1=2)(^ x1 + ^ x2) is the mean demand function. Nu-
merical solution of this di®erential equation shows that c(2) < 1:1203. Thus, consumers
1 and 2 require 75% more income in order to be compensated for a doubling of the price
of good 1. But the representative consumer requires only 12% more income. The incon-
sistency ratio is more than 1.56. In order to be compensated for the price rise, the actual
consumers require over 56% more than the representative consumer requires.
In Example 4.2, the consumer's preferences are transformed without changing their in-
di®erence curves through the points A and B. Such a transformation is possible because
in the initial consumption sector the set of mean situations that yield the consumer utility
vector (u1;u2) (with the price of good 2 ¯xed) is disconnected. Jerison (1984) shows that as
long as the mean situations that yield a given vector of consumer utilities form a connected
set, the representative consumer must be indi®erent among them. The disconnectedness
in Figure 1 comes from the fact that for consumer 2 the goods are perfect complements (a
large change in relative prices has little e®ect on the ratio of demands), whereas for con-
sumer 1 the goods are substitutes. There is no obvious reason for ruling out such preference
pro¯les.
The same perturbation argument used to construct example 4.2 shows that every utility
function can be viewed as the utility of a Pareto inconsistent representative consumer for
some consumption sector. To be more precise, for every smooth indirect utility function
v there exists a consumption sector with a Pareto inconsistent representative consumer
whose indirect utility function is v. This can be seen by starting with a consumption sector
in which all the consumers have the indirect utility function v and equal incomes. Then
it is possible to perturb the consumers' preferences so that there are two consumer types,
with indi®erence curves that di®er from those of the representative consumer and that
cross twice like those of consumers 1 and 2 in Figure 1a. Then a slight °attening of the
indi®erence curves of consumer 1 as in Figure 1b makes the representative consumer Pareto
inconsistent, with all goods normal for all consumers.
The large Pareto inconsistency in example 4.2 may be considered pathological since it
contains a Gi®en good. The reason for the Gi®en e®ect can be seen in Figure 1b. By
comparing the slopes of the indi®erence curves of consumer 1 at a low price p1, we see that
a rise in income raises the consumer's demand for good 1 rapidly. The budget constraint
implies that the demand for good 2 falls, so good 2 is inferior in that region. The indi®erence
curves are also nearly linear, so the substitution e®ect is small and good 2 is a Gi®en good.
When Gi®en goods are ruled out, the lower indi®erence curve of consumer 1 cannot be as
°at as it is in Figure 1b, and this restricts the size of the Pareto inconsistency. In the next
two sections we will consider other sources of bounds on Pareto inconsistencies.
5. A Bound on the Pareto Inconsistency of a Representative Consumer
Representative consumers' Pareto inconsistencies cannot be arbitrarily large. This is
implied by the following fact, which is of independent interest. It is impossible for all the12
consumers to prefer situation A to B if B is revealed preferred to A for the representative
consumer.
Lemma 5.1. If (p;y) is strictly revealed preferred to (q;z) for the representative consumer
then at least one consumer prefers (p;y) to (q;z).
Proof. Suppose that pXi(q;Di(q;z)) ¸ Di(p;y) for every i. Summing over i yields pX(q;z) ¸
y. Thus if (p;y) is strictly revealed preferred to (q;z) by the representative consumer
(pX(q;z) < y) then pXi(q;Di(q;z)) < Di(p;y) and V i(q;z) < V i(p;y) for some i. ¤
If all the consumers are at least as well o® at (q;z) as at (y;p) then aggregate income
y cannot be too high. Lemma 1 implies that y · pX(q;z). Similarly, if all the consumers
are at least as well o® at (p;y) as at (q;z) then there is a lower bound on y determined
by qX(p;y) ¸ z. Let y¤(q;p) be the minimum y satisfying qX(p;y) ¸ 1. It follows that
the inconsistency ratio for a move from (q;1) to the price vector p lies in the interval
[y¤(q;p)=e¤(q;p);pX(q;1)=e¤(q;p)], where e¤(q;p) ´ e(p;v(q;1)).
The interval determines bounds that are not tight. Better bounds can probably be
found. But for commonly used models and normal price variation, the interval above is
rather small. Consider, for example, a Cobb-Douglas representative consumer in a two-good








y¤(q;p) = p1p2=(®p2 + ¯p1). The weakest bound on the inconsistency ratio occurs when
® = ¯ = 1=2. (This is the case in which pX(q;1)=y¤(q;p) is maximized.) In this case, the




p1p2]. If, starting at
the price vector q = (1;1), the price of good 1 doubles and the price of good 2 does not
change, then the inconsistency ratio lies in the interval [:9428;1:0607]. So the compensation
required by the Cobb-Douglas representative consumer will not di®er by more than about
6% from that required by the actual consumers when the price of good 1 doubles.
6. Nonrepresentative Representative Consumers in Macroeconomics
The preferences of the nonrepresentative representative consumer in Example 4.2 are far
from homothetic. This is not an accident. It comes from the twisting of the indi®erence
curves in Figure 1b. In this section we show that a homothetic representative consumer
can be Pareto inconsistent, but the inconsistency bounds obtained above are especially
con¯ning in that case. We will argue that the homothetic representative consumers most
often used in macroeconomics are unlikely to have large Pareto inconsistencies, given the
range of price variation in typical applications.
We focus on communities with two consumers and ¯xed income shares. In that case, the
consumers' demands and indirect utilities have the special functional forms in Lemma 6.1,
which make it possible to compute inconsistency ratios. We conjecture that the inconsis-
tencies cannot be much larger in communities with more consumers and price-dependent
income shares.
Lemma 6.1. In a two consumer community with income shares µi and a homothetic rep-
resentative consumer, the consumer demands have the form
X
1(p;y1) = y1K(p) + ¹(y1=µ1;p)B(p) and X
2(p;y2) = y2K(p) ¡ ¹(y2=µ2;p)B(p);
where ¿ is scalar valued. The indirect utilities have the form vi(p;yi) = ºi(®(p);¯(p);yi),
where ® and ¯ are scalar valued and homogeneous of degree 1.13
Proof. De¯ne F(p;y) ´ (1=µ1)X1(p;µ1y) ¡ (1=µ2)X2(p;µ2y) and note that Fy(p;y) =
M1(p;µ1y) ¡ M2(p;µ2y). In the given community, CD(p;y) = yµ1µ2Fy(p;y)F(p;y)T. Exis-
tence of a representative consumer implies that the matrix Fy(p;y)F(p;y)T = F(p;y)Fy(p;y)T,
so there is a scalar valued function ¹ such that Fy(p;y) = ¹(p;y)F(p;y) wherever F(p;y) 6=
0. Then F(p;y) = ¿(p;y)B(p) for some scalar valued ¿ and vector valued B. So (1=µ2)X2(p;µ2y) =
(1=µ1)X1(p;µ1y)¡¿(p;y)B(p). Since the representative consumer is homothetic, aggregate
demand is linear in income: X1(p;µ1y) + X2(p;µ2y) = yK(p), and therefore X1(p;µ1y) =
yK(p)¡(µ2=µ1)X1(p;µ1y)+µ2¿(p;y)B(p) and X1(p;µ1y) = µ1yK(p)+µ1µ2¿(p;y)B(p) and
X2(p;µ2y) = µ2yK(p) ¡ µ1µ2¿(p;y)B(p). These are the forms above with ¹ = µ1µ2¿. The
forms of the indirect utilities of these \rank two" demands were derived by Gorman (1981).
(See also Lewbel (1991).) ¤
Example 6.2 Consider a two consumer community with ¯xed income shares and a repre-
sentative consumer with homothetic, stationary, completely separable preferences for °ows
of consumption expenditures over an in¯nite time horizon, as is commonly assumed in










where x = fxtg1
t=0 and where xt is consumption expenditure in period t. The corresponding
















where ² ´ (¾ ¡ 1)=¾, and y is interpreted as lifetime wealth. If the consumer can borrow
or save at a constant interest rate r then the price of consumption expenditure in period t
can be taken to be pt = (1 + r)¡t, and optimal consumption (when it exists) grows at the
rate g, where
±(1 + r) = (1 + g)
¾:
By Roy's identity, Xi(p;y) = (1=vi
y(p;y))vi
p(p;y), at each (p;y), the two consumers'
demand vectors and the aggregate demand are contained in the span of the two gradient
vectors @®(p) and @¯(p), where ® and ¯ are the functions in the indirect utility functions
in Lemma 6.1. It follows that the representative consumer's indirect utility function can
be written as v(p;y) = º(®(p);¯(p);y), and hence that (
P1
t=0 ±t=¾p²
t)¡1=² is a function of
®(p) and ¯(p). This implies that ® and ¯ are separable in each price, and have the CES
form. Numerical computations suggest that the largest Pareto inconsistencies arise when
® is a function of prices p1;:::;pT for some T and ¯ is a function of the remaining prices.
















and the representative consumer's expenditure function is e(p; ¹ u) = ~ e(®(p);¯(p))¹ u, where
~ e(a;b) ´ (a² + b²)1=².
The functions ® and ¯ can be interpreted as price indices for commodity aggregates
representing early and late consumption. The preferences of the representative and the
two actual consumers are determined by their preferences for these commodity aggregates.
The analysis is thus reduced to the two good case in Example 4.2. The worst possible14
Pareto inconsistencies arise in cases when the actual consumers' indi®erence curves have
very di®erent curvature, as they have in Figure 1b. We obtain extreme examples by letting
the utility function of consumer 2 (for the two aggregate commodities) be u2(x1;x2) ´
(x1+x2)=(s¡1) if sx1+x2 < s and u2(x1;x2) ´ [1=(s¡1)]+(x2=s) otherwise, where s > 1
is a ¯xed scalar. It is easy to verify that u2 is continuous, quasiconcave and nondecreasing.
Consumer 2 demands strictly positive amounts of both commodity aggregates whenever
sb > y > a > b, where y is the consumer's income and a and b are the price indices of
early and late consumption. On this region consumer 2 has the indirect utility function
v2(a;b;y) = [(y¡a)=(sb¡a)]+s and the demand function x2 = (sb¡y)=(sb¡a) for good 1.
The demands of consumer 2 and the representative consumer determine those of consumer
1. At prices a and b for the aggregate commodities the demand for good 1 by consumer 1
is x1(a;b;y) = 2y[a²¡1=(a² +b²)]¡[(sb¡y)=(sb¡a)]. Suppose that we ¯x ¹ u and aL and let
yL ´ e1(aL;1; ¹ u) and y(a) ´ e1(a;1; ¹ u), where e1 is the expenditure function for consumer
1 in terms of the aggregated commodities. Then y(¢) is the income compensation function
that solves the di®erential equation y0(a) = P(a)y(a) ¡ Q(a), with the initial condition
y(aL) = yL, where P(a) = 2a²¡1=(a² + 1) and Q(a) = s=(s ¡ a). The graph of y(¢) is the
indi®erence curve for consumer 1 of utility level ¹ u in the space of income and the price of




























(1 ¡ 2m)(s ¡ a)
:
To construct examples of Pareto inconsistency, we ¯x T, the date separating early and
late consumption, and specify alternative values of the interest rate. These interest rates
determine alternative prices of early and late consumption (aj;bj), for j = L;H. We
then ¯nd yL and yH such that both consumers 1 and 2 are indi®erent between the budget
situations (aL=bL;1;yL) and (aH=bH;1;yH). The yL and yH are the unique solutions to the
equations yH = y(aH=bH;yL) and v2(aL=bL;1;yL) = v2(aH=bH;1;yH). The solution yH is
the wealth required by both consumers to compensate for a rise in the relative price of early
consumption from aL=bL to aH=bH. The wealth required by the representative consumer is
yR = yL[((aH=bH)² + 1)=((aL=bL)² + 1)]1=². If yR 6= yH then the representative consumer is
Pareto inconsistent, and the inconsistency ration is yH=yR.
We consider Pareto inconsistencies that can arise in the example of Lucas (1987) who
compared a budget situation in which the representative consumer's consumption expen-
diture grows at 3% to a situation in which the consumption growth rate is 6%.
Case A. Let ± = :97 and ¾ = 2, so that ² = 1=2.
These are parameters taken as the base case by Stokey and Rebelo (1995) in their analysis
of growth under alternative capital and labor tax rates. The optimal (constant) rate of
consumption growth for the representative consumer changes from 3% to 6% if the interest
rate changes from approximately 9.37% to 15.8%. The interest rate determines relative
prices of early and late consumption for each value of T. It turns out that the inconsistency
ratio is maximized when T = 59. For this T, a rise in the interest rate from 9.37% to15
15.8% raises the relative price of early consumption, a=b, from 5.43 to 14.67. Taking
s = 1:001(aH=bH) ¼ 14:68, the inconsistency ratio is approximately 1.0217.
Case B. Let ± = :95 and ¾ = 1.
This is the case of Cobb-Douglas utility used by Lucas (1987). The rate of consumption
growth for the representative consumer rises from 3% to 6% when the interest rate changes
from 8.4% to 11.58%. Again, taking s = 1:001(aH=bH), the largest inconsistency ratio is
slightly below 1.034, and it occurs with T = 30.
The inconsistencies in these examples (less than 3.4%) are well below the inconsistency
bounds implied by Lemma 5.1 (9.6% for Case A and 11.8% for Case B). Those bounds are
not tight, whereas the examples themselves appear to be close to the worst possible given
the range of relative price variation when the representative consumer has the utility u.
The speci¯cation of the preferences of consumer 2 (through the choice of s) depends on the
range of price variation. Over this range, good 1 is inferior for consumer 2. Still, the degree
of Pareto inconsistency is small. If both goods were normal for both consumers, the incon-
sistency would be even smaller. We conclude that if the representative consumer in Lucas'
example accurately represents aggregate demand behavior in the positive sense, there must
be consumers willing to pay nearly as much as the representative consumer pays for higher
growth. If many consumers are not willing to pay that much, then there must be many
consumers willing to pay more. The derivation above points to the possibility of testing
macroeconomic representative consumer models by comparing their welfare judgments to
the preferences of real consumers.
7. Normative Representative Consumers
The Pareto inconsistencies illustrated above show that representative consumer models
might not be adequate for normative analysis even if the representative consumer perfectly
represents aggregate demand behavior. On the other hand, Dow and Werlang (1988) show
that if a representative consumer is Pareto consistent, its preferences have a welfare inter-
pretation: they are the same as preferences generated by a particular Bergson-Samuelson
social welfare function. To state this result precisely, we say that a representative con-
sumer (for D) has a welfare interpretation if its preferences over situations are represented
by w[V D(p;y)] for some nondecreasing function w that is strictly increasing on the set of
attainable consumer utility vectors fV D(p;y)jy ¸ 0;p À 0g.
Proposition 7.1. A representative consumer has a welfare interpretation if and only if it
is Pareto consistent.
For a proof, see Dow and Werlang (1988) or Jerison (1994). Note that a social planner
might have a social welfare function that is di®erent from the w in the previous paragraph.
Then the planners' preferences would di®er from those of the representative consumer even
if the latter had a welfare interpretation.
It is an open question under what conditions a consumption sector has a Pareto con-
sistent representative consumer. One well known su±cient condition is that the income
distribution rule is optimal with respect to a social welfare function.
Proposition 7.2. If the income distribution rule is optimal then the consumption sector
has a Pareto consistent representative consumer.
Chipman and Moore (1979) and Dow and Sonnenschein (1986) show that when D is opti-
mal, there is a utility function that generates a correspondence that contains the aggregate16
demand function as a selection. Jerison (1994) shows that since the aggregate demand func-
tion is smooth, the utility function generates the aggregate demand function itself. The
distribution rule need not be uniquely optimal, but every other optimal rule determines
the same aggregate demand.
The converse of Proposition 7.2 is false.
Proposition 7.3. The income distribution rule need not be optimal for a consumption
sector to have a Pareto consistent representative consumer.
To prove Proposition 7.3 we use the following property of consumption sectors with
optimal income distribution, proved by Jerison (1994).
Proposition 7.4. If the income distribution rule D is optimal then for each situation (p;y)
the covariance matrix CD(p;y) is symmetric and positive semide¯nite.
It follows that if the covariance matrix fails to be symmetric or positive semide¯nite, then
there is no social welfare function for which the distribution rule is optimal. We prove
Proposition 7.3 by exhibiting a consumption sector with a Pareto consistent representative
consumer and a covariance matrix that is not positive semide¯nite.
Example 7.5. Pareto Consistency Without Optimal Income Distribution
Consider a consumption sector with two goods and two consumers with equal income shares.
Consumer 1 has Cobb-Douglas utility and demand function
X
1
1(p;y1) = y1=(2p1); X
1
2(p;y1) = y1=(2p2):
Consumer 2 has the demand function
X
2
1(p;y2) = (y2=2p1) + (p1=2y2); X
2
2(p;y2) = (y2=2p2) ¡ [p
2
1=(2p2y2)]:
The demand vector X2(p;y2) of consumer 2 is nonnegative whenever y2 ¸ p1: We restrict
attention to mean incomes and prices in this region.








The two consumers receive equal shares of aggregate income, so when they have income y

















An indirect utility function for this aggregate demand function is v(p;y) = [y2=(p1p2)] ¡
(p1=p2). It is easy to show that v1, v2 and v are quasiconvex in p over the region where
X2 À 0.
To show that the distribution rule is not optimal with respect to any social welfare
function it su±ces to show that the covariance matrix of average and marginal properties to
consume is not positive semide¯nite. By (3.1), the upper left component of this covariance




































Thus the covariance matrix is not positive semide¯nite, and the income distribution cannot
be optimal.
To show that the representative consumer is Pareto consistent, let each consumer i have

































so the representative consumer prefers the price vector p to q at aggregate income 2y: This
shows that the representative consumer is Pareto consistent.
Mas-Colell et. al. (1995) call a representative consumer \normative" if the distribution
rule is optimal for some social welfare function. Proposition 7.1 and Example 7.6 suggest
this terminology is unduly restrictive. A representative consumer's preferences can coincide
with social welfare in all aggregate situations even though the distribution rule is not
optimal. It seems more appropriate to say that a representative consumer is normative if
it has a welfare interpretation. The term then applies in a broader class of communities.
It remains an open question how to characterize consumption sectors with Pareto consis-
tent representative consumers. The next result provides a su±cient condition in a special
case.
Proposition 7.6. In a community with two goods, two consumers and a representative
consumer, the representative consumer is Pareto consistent if for each p À 0 the matrix of
covariances CD(p;1) is nonzero.
In a two-good economy, the matrix of covariances is symmetric. If it is positive semide¯nite,
then a representative consumer exists. If in addition the matrix is nonzero at every p, then,
by Proposition 7.6, the representative consumer is Pareto consistent.
Figure 218
Figure 2 shows the main idea in the proof. In the ¯gure, the actual consumers, 1 and 2,
prefer A to B, but the representative consumer prefers B to A. By minimizing the utility
of the representative consumer along the indi®erence curve of consumer 2 through A, we
obtain a point C at which the consumers' indi®erence curves are tangent to each other. At
such a point, the matrix of covariances is 0. Therefore, as long as the covariance matrix is
nonzero everywhere, the representative consumer is Pareto consistent.
Proof of Proposition 7.6: Suppose that all the consumers in the community prefer (q;z)
to (¹ y; ¹ p), but the representative consumer prefers (¹ p; ¹ y) to (q;z). We will show that this
leads to a contradiction. By the homogeneity of D and of each consumer's indirect utility
function, there is no loss of generality in assuming that q2 = ¹ p2. If q1 = ¹ p1 then there cannot
be a Pareto inconsistency, since the utility of each consumer (including the representative)
is strictly increasing in aggregate income. Assume that ¹ p1 > q1.
We begin by showing that XD1
1 (q;z) 6= XD2
1 (q;z). Recall that
P
i Di





y > 0 for each i. Also, for each i, XDi(p;y) and XD(p;y) satisfy the same
budget identity, px = y. Since there are only two goods, if XD1
1 (q;z) = XD2
1 (q;z) then
XD1(q;z) = XD2(q;z) = XD(q;z). But then CD(q;z) = 0, contradicting the hypothesis.
This proves that XD1
1 (q;z) 6= XD2
1 (q;z), and without loss of generality we can assume that
XD1
1 (q;z) > XD2
1 (q;z). It follows that XD





Consider the minimization problem
min
p;y
v(p;y) s.t. y · ¹ y + 1; ¹ p1 ¸ p1 ¸ q1; p2 = ¹ p2;
and V D2(p;y) = V D2(q;z):
The constraint set is compact and contains (q;z), so the problem has a solution denoted
(p¤;y¤). If p¤
1 = ¹ p1 then p¤ = ¹ p and y¤ > ¹ y, since V D2(¹ p; ¹ y) < V D2(q;z) = V D2(p¤;y¤).
But then v(p¤;y¤) > v(¹ p; ¹ y) > v(q;z), which contradicts the assumption that (p¤;y¤)
solves the minimization problem. Thus p¤
1 < ¹ p1. Since v is nonincreasing in prices and
nondecreasing in aggregate income, the ¯rst two constraints in the minimization problem
hold with strict inequality. With these constraints not binding, the necessary ¯rst order
conditions are vy ¡ ¸V D2
y = 0 and vp1 ¡ ¸V D2
p1 ¡ ¹ = 0, for nonnegative scalars ¸ and ¹,
with ¹(p¤
1 ¡ q1) = 0, where the subscripts denote partial derivatives and all functions are
evaluated at (p¤;y¤).
Note that ¡vp=vy = XD and ¡V D2
p =V D2
y = XD2. So the ¯rst order conditions above
imply that XD
1 (p¤;y¤) · XD2
1 (p¤;y¤), with equality if p¤
1 > q1 (since p¤
1 > q1 implies
¹ = 0). It follows that (p¤;y¤) 6= (q;z) since XD
1 (q;z) > XD2
1 (q;z). Therefore p¤
1 > q1
and XD(p¤;y¤) = XD2(p¤;y¤). This implies that XD1 = XD2 = XD at (p¤;y¤), since P
Di
yXDi = XD. But then CD(p¤;y¤) = 0, which contradicts the hypothesis. This proves
that there cannot be a Pareto inconsistency of the form described above with ¹ p1 > q1.
If ¹ p1 < q1 we arrive at a similar contradiction by showing that XD
1 (¹ p; ¹ y) is strictly between
XD1
1 (¹ p; ¹ y) and XD2
1 (¹ p; ¹ y), and then by minimizing V Di(p;y) subject to v(p;y) = v(¹ p; ¹ y),
¹ p1 · p1 · q1 and p2 = ¹ p2, where consumer i has the larger XDi
1 (¹ p; ¹ y). ¤
8. Conclusion
Positive representative consumers are Pareto consistent locally, but not necessarily glob-
ally. The problem of characterizing communities with globally Pareto consistent represen-
tative consumers remains open. In the examples above, the Pareto inconsistencies arise be-
cause the degree of substitutability among commodities is signi¯cantly di®erent for di®erent
consumers. Figures 1a and 1b suggest that a \single crossing" property for the consumers'19
indi®erence curves ensures Pareto consistency. This is the type of condition implied by the
matrix of covariances being nonzero in Proposition 7.6; however, that proposition does not
generalize beyond the case of two goods and two consumers.
The matrix of covariances must be positive semide¯nite in order for the distribution
rule to optimal with respect to some social welfare function (Jerison (1994)). If the con-
sumers receive ¯xed shares of aggregate income, then positive semide¯niteness of the ma-
trix of covariances is essentially equivalent to the requirement that the consumers' demand
vectors become more dispersed when their incomes all rise by the same amount (Jerison
(1994)). This \increasing dispersion" is plausible and has empirical support in some con-
texts (HÄ ardle, et. al. (1991), Hildenbrand (1994)). But it follows from an example of
Schlee (2005) that positive semide¯niteness of the covariance matrix is not su±cient for
the distribution rule to be optimal with respect to a social welfare function. Schlee's re-
sults may also help to determine whether increasing dispersion, along with symmetry of
the covariance matrix CD, is su±cient for existence of a Pareto consistent representative
consumer when income shares are ¯xed.
We have argued that a positive representative consumer of the CES form common in
macroeconomics is unlikely to be very Pareto inconsistent. In Lucas' (1987) growth exam-
ple, if the actual consumers prefer one growth path A to B and the representative consumer
prefers B to A, it does not take much compensation to make the representative accept A.
For the cases considered in section 6, if the representative consumer is willing to give up
42% of its initial consumption in order to raise its consumption growth rate by three per-
centage points, then some consumer in the represented community must be willing to give
up more than 40% of its initial consumption for the same rise in consumption growth. The
argument in section 6 is just illustrative, but it suggests that one might test commonly used
macroeconomic models by asking whether the preferences of their representative consumers
di®er greatly from those of real consumers.
The Pareto inconsistencies of positive representative consumers in macroeconomics may
be small, but this does not extend the applicability of such models very far. A typical
community does not have a positive representative consumer at all. Furthermore, even
if there is a Pareto consistent representative consumer, its preferences need not be useful
for policy evaluation. The representative consumer's preferences are a special form of
compensation criterion (Jerison (1990)). They attach greater weight to richer consumers
who consume more. It is possible that the representative consumer agrees with only a tiny
minority of the community in its evaluation of the relevant policy alternatives. For these
reasons, it may not be appropriate to identify a representative consumer's preferences with
social welfare even if doing so entails no logical inconsistency.
FOOTNOTES
1. For vectors x = (x1;:::;xn) and y = (y1;:::;yn) we write x À y [resp. x ¸ y] if xj > yj
[resp. xj ¸ yj] for j = 1;:::;n.
2. A function w is nondecreasing if u ¸ r implies w(u) ¸ w(r) for every u and r in the
domain of w. The function w is strictly increasing on a set if w(u) À w(r) whenever u À r
for u and r in the set.
3. An n£n matrix M (not necessarily symmetric) is positive [respectively, negative] de¯nite
on a set X if xTMx > [<]0 for every x 6= 0 in X. The matrix M is positive [respectively,
negative] semide¯nite on X if xTMx ¸ [·]0 for every x 2 X. We omit is reference to X if
it is Rn.20
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